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IN SEARCH OF REDEMPTION: 
Expungement of Federal Criminal Records 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The presumption of innocence applicable to criminal proceedings is a hallmark of our 
democracy.  Nevertheless, if often proves difficult to overcome the societal stigma that attaches 
to criminal charges – even decades after wrongfully accused defendants are exonerated.  In 
addition, the difficulties in overcoming the sundry legal and practical disabilities created by a 
conviction perpetuates recidivism (thereby threatening public safety and consuming tax dollars) 
by frustrating ex-offenders’ efforts at reentering society as productive, law-abiding contributors.  
Barriers to reentry for nonviolent, good hearted, low-risk, onetime offenders may include, inter 
alia: difficulty in securing post-conviction employment; hurdles in accessing educational and 
training services, such as federal student aid ineligibility for certain convictions; a federal 
lifetime ban from food stamps and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, which can thwart 
an ex-offender’s efforts to receive appropriate addiction treatment; eviction from public housing 
based on an arrest prior to conviction and permanent ineligibility for public housing based on 
conviction; ineligibility for federal and state occupational licenses; subjecting noncitizen 
offenders to deportation; and obstacles to a healthy family life, such as a prohibition from foster 
care and adoption programs. 
 
These barriers disappear where a former defendant is able to expunge his/her criminal 
record and is no longer forced to disclose it on applications for employment, educational 
opportunities, housing, public assistance, and so forth.  To cure this injustice, most states have 
varying mechanisms to expunge criminal records.  For example, many states – including New 
Jersey – have enacted legislation providing for expungements as a matter of right for dismissed 
charges and low-level misdemeanors and after proving rehabilitation to a judge if the records 
pertain to certain nonviolent felony convictions.  However, no statute creating a generally 
available federal expungement remedy exists, and numerous Courts of Appeals have adopted the 
view that there is no judicial authority to expunge federal criminal records absent specific 
legislation or extremely rare and extraordinary circumstances. This paper will first examine the 
problems for society and for former defendants created by those collateral consequences of 
criminal records and the consequent inescapable lifelong sentence.  Then, this paper will analyze 
the disparity of expungement remedies available in the federal courts, which do not agree on 
their jurisdiction to consider the issue; expungement powers pursuant to federal statutes; and 
expungements made available by state statutes for state criminal records. Finally, this paper will 
compare two congressional proposals to enact federal expungement legislation and argue for the 
passage of a bill that combines the best elements of those proposals with effective state models. 
 
 
 
        RAJ MUKHERJI* 
NOVEMBER 23, 2012 
 
*Under the supervision of, and with undying gratitude to, PROFESSOR CATHERINE MC CAULIFF. 
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I. Introduction 
 “To err is human, to forgive, divine.”1 
 The presumption of innocence applicable to criminal proceedings is a hallmark of our 
democracy.  Nevertheless, if often proves difficult to overcome the societal stigma that attaches 
to criminal charges – even after wrongfully accused defendants are exonerated.  In addition, the 
difficulties in overcoming the sundry legal and practical disabilities created by a conviction 
perpetuates recidivism among individuals who otherwise could have been one-time, first-time 
offenders turned productive, law-abiding contributors to society.  To cure this injustice, most 
states have varying mechanisms to expunge criminal records.  For example, many states – 
including New Jersey – have enacted legislation providing for expungements as a matter of right 
for dismissed charges and low-level misdemeanors and after proving rehabilitation to a judge if 
the records pertain to certain nonviolent felony convictions.  However, no statute creating a 
generally available federal expungement remedy exists, and numerous Courts of Appeals have 
adopted the view that there is no judicial authority to expunge federal criminal records absent 
specific legislation or extremely rare and extraordinary circumstances. 
 With tens of millions of American criminal records readily available online2 and over 
80% of American employers conducting criminal background checks on new hires,3 the 
existence of a single nonviolent item on a criminal history – however old or innocuous – is 
                                                            
1 ALEXANDER POPE, An Essay on Criticism, in COLLECTED POEMS 58, 71 (1924). 
2 Alfred Blumstein & Kiminori Nakamura, “Redemption” in an Era of Widespread Criminal 
Background Checks, 263 NIJ J. 10, 10 (2009), available at 
http://www.nij.gov/journals/263/redemption.htm (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
SURVEY OF STATE CRIMINAL HISTORY INFORMATION SYSTEMS, 2003 (2006), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&iid=290)). 
3 Blumstein, supra note 2, at 10 (citing M.E. BURKE, SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT, 2004 REFERENCE AND BACKGROUND CHECKING SURVEY REPORT: A STUDY BY 
THE SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (2006)). 
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increasingly frustrating efforts of former defendants to secure employment, occupational 
licenses, or customers in self-employed situations.  Knowledge of the criminal history of an ex-
offender or even an innocent defendant who has been exonerated can “produce assumptions of 
past dishonesty and future untrustworthiness in the minds of all those aware of that history.”4  As 
a result of those assumptions as well as various statutory, regulatory, and organizational policy-
based disqualifications for individuals with certain criminal histories, former defendants are 
forced to cope with, inter alia, injury to their reputations and difficulty in obtaining employment, 
even when charges were dropped;5 eviction from public housing based on an arrest prior to 
conviction and permanent ineligibility for public housing based on conviction;6 difficulty in 
returning to school, as a consequence of federal student aid ineligibility for certain convictions;7 
a federal lifetime ban from food stamps and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families; 8 and 
obstacles to a healthy family life such as a prohibition from foster care and adoption programs. 9 
 Considering the attention of policymakers and academia to reentry and reintegration, 
there is a surprising paucity of scholarly literature examining expungement of federal criminal 
records and the congressional proposals that have not advanced.  Therefore, this paper will first 
examine the problems for society and former defendants created by those collateral 
consequences of criminal records and the resultant inescapable lifelong sentence.  Then, this 
                                                            
4 Fruqan Mouzon, Forgive Us Our Trespasses: The Need for Federal Expungement Legislation, 
39 U. MEM. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2008). 
5 See, e.g., Ritesh Patel, Comment, Hall v. Alabama: Do Federal Courts Have Jurisdiction to 
Expunge Criminal Records?, 34 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 401, 401 (2010); Zainab Wurie, 
Comment, Tainted: The Need for Equity Based Federal Expungement, 6 S. REGION BLACK L. 
STUDENTS ASS’N L.J. 31, 32-33 (2012). 
6 Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002). 
7 20 U.S.C. 1091(r). 
8 21 U.S.C. 862a(a). 
9 42 U.S.C. 671(20)(a) (requiring states to comply with the requirements of the Adoption and 
Safe Families Act (ASFA) of 1997 in order to receive AFSA funding). 
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paper will analyze the disparity of expungement remedies available in the federal courts, which 
do not agree on their jurisdiction to consider the issue; expungement powers pursuant to federal 
statutes; and expungements made available by state statutes for state criminal records. Finally, 
this paper will compare two congressional proposals to enact federal expungement legislation 
and argue for the passage of a bill that combines elements of those proposals with effective state 
models. 
 
II. The Problem: Criminal Records Create an Inescapable Lifelong Sentence 
The pervasiveness of criminal records in the Internet age creates a serious problem not 
only for the offenders and subjects of the records, but also for the economy and for public safety 
by proliferating recidivists and frustrating the ability of ex-offenders to reenter society and avoid 
returning to prison.  Law enforcement agencies nationwide made over 12.4 million non-traffic 
arrests in 2011.10  Prison populations in the United States and taxpayer costs associated thereto 
have skyrocketed in recent years.11  According to the Pew Center on the States, by 2008, one out 
of every 100 American adults was incarcerated, and by 2009, one out of every 31 American 
adults was either in jail, on probation, or on parole.12  The United States has more people in 
prison than any other country in the world.13  The Justice Department’s FY 2013 budget request 
                                                            
10 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES, 2011 (2012), 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-the-u.s/2011/crime-in-the-u.s.-2011/tables/table-
29. 
11 PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, STATE OF RECIDIVISM: THE REVOLVING DOOR OF AMERICA’S 
PRISONS 2 (2011), http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/ 
sentencing_and_corrections/State_Recidivism_Revolving_Door_America_Prisons%20.pdf. 
12 Id. 
13 ROY WALMSLEY, INT’L CTR. FOR PRISON STUDIES, WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST (8th ed. 
2009), available at http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/downloads/wppl-8th_41.pdf. 
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for the federal prison system is just shy of $7 billion,14 while state spending on corrections totals 
an additional $52 billion annually.15  Therefore, America spends more on prisons than the entire 
annual expenditures of many countries’ governments, including Ukraine, the Philippines, 
Pakistan, Cuba, Chile, and Morocco.16  Furthermore, “[s]tate spending on corrections quadrupled 
during the past two decades.”17 
 One of the primary factors exacerbating the problems of prison overcrowding and 
correctional spending is recidivism.  Nationally, 43.3% – nearly half – of inmates released from 
prisons nationally were back in jail within three years.18  Even as the national crime rate has 
declined steadily over the past two decades, the rate of recidivism within three years for released 
inmates charged with a new crime (as opposed to parole violations) has continued to increase.19  
Studies have shown that unemployment is a leading indicator of likelihood to recidivate, while 
ex-offenders are less likely to commit a crime in the future when they have employment 
stability.20 
While the correlation between employment and (lack of) recidivism is unsurprising and 
generally comports with the notion that idle hands are the devil’s workshop, it creates a chicken-
or-the-egg paradox.  On one hand, we want ex-offenders to find jobs to help them stay out of 
trouble and avoid returning to prison (while becoming productive contributors to society and the 
                                                            
14 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL PRISON SYSTEM (BOP): FY 2013 BUDGET REQUEST AT A 
GLANCE (2012), http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2013summary/pdf/fy13-bop-bud-summary.pdf. 
15 Pew, supra note 11, at 2. 
16 CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, FIELD LISTING: BUDGET (2012), 
available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2056.html. 
17 Pew, supra note 3, at 2. 
18 Id. at 9. 
19 Id. 
20 Burt W. Griffin & Lewis R. Katz, Overriding Purposes and Basic Principles of Felony 
Sentencing, OH. FELONY SENT. L. § 5:53 (2008). 
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economy).  On the other hand, far too often, it is the ex-offender’s criminal record more than any 
other factor (frequently, the only factor) that impedes securing lawful employment.  Despite the 
stated goal in President Barack Obama’s crime and law enforcement agenda to “break down 
employment barriers for people who have a prior criminal record, but who have stayed clean of 
further involvement with the criminal justice system,”21 the stigma associated with the record of 
a criminal conviction – or even a mere arrest or unproven charge – continues to pervade job 
searches by former offenders and even former acquitted defendants. 
 A study by the Society for Human Resource Management indicates that over 80% of 
American employers conduct criminal background checks on prospective employees.22 In 2006 
(six years ago, which is an eternity in the context of rapid advances in information technology 
and online availability of data), more than 74 million American criminal records were available 
online in automated databases out of 81 million criminal records on file nationwide.23  
Considering the widespread proliferation of public records on the Internet, arrest and conviction 
information – regardless of the nature of the offense or time lapsed – are readily available to 
interfere with the rehabilitation and reentry of ex-offenders into society.  Indeed, “collateral bars 
to employment [can] prevent someone who was trained for a job while incarcerated—at 
taxpayers’ expense—from taking the very job for which he or she was trained.”24   
                                                            
21 Alfred Blumstein & Kiminori Nakamura, “Redemption” in an Era of Widespread Criminal 
Background Checks, 263 NIJ J. 10 (2009), available at 
http://www.nij.gov/journals/263/redemption.htm. 
22 Id. (citing M.E. BURKE, SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, 2004 REFERENCE AND 
BACKGROUND CHECKING SURVEY REPORT: A STUDY BY THE SOCIETY FOR HUMAN RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT (2006)). 
23 Blumstein, supra note 2, at 10 (citing BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SURVEY OF STATE 
CRIMINAL HISTORY INFORMATION SYSTEMS, 2003 (2006), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&iid=290)). 
24 Christopher Gowen & Erin Magary, Collateral Consequences: How Reliable Data and 
Resources Can Change the Way Law Is Practiced, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 65, 69 (2011). 
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Difficulty in finding post-conviction employment is only one of numerous reentry 
barriers faced by ex-offenders.  The mere existence of a criminal record also perpetuates 
recidivism (thereby threatening public safety and consuming tax dollars) by frustrating former 
defendants’ ability to access educational and training services, healthcare, affordable housing, or 
occupational licensure; subjecting noncitizen offenders to deportation; and interfering with their 
family lives (such as thwarting their ability to care for foster children or adopt).  With all of these 
hurdles to reentering society, one can hardly be surprised that so many low-risk first-time 
offenders are drawn back into criminal activity, propagating the cycle of recidivism. 
Specifically, these collateral consequences of a criminal record – creating a life sentence 
for the defendant, even if the sentence for a relatively minor offense was not custodial in nature – 
include: 
• A five-year prohibition from foster care and adoption programs for drug-related 
convictions and other felony offenses.25 
• A federal lifetime ban from food stamps and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, 
which can thwart an ex-offender’s efforts to receive appropriate addiction treatment.26 
• Ineligibility for federal student aid (such as grants, loans, and work assistance 
programs) based on drug offenses.27 
• Ineligibility for (and/or eviction from) public housing.  Housing authorities may evict 
an entire low-income household based upon a mere arrest, rather than waiting for a conviction, 
pursuant to HUD regulations and the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988.28 
                                                            
25 42 U.S.C. 671(20)(a) (requiring states to comply with the requirements of the Adoption and 
Safe Families Act (ASFA) of 1997 in order to receive AFSA funding). 
26 21 U.S.C. 862a(a). 
27 20 U.S.C. 1091(r). 
28 Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002). 
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These barriers disappear where a former defendant is able to seal or destroy his/her 
criminal record through a procedure known as expungement and is no longer forced to disclose it 
on applications for employment, educational opportunities, housing, public assistance, and so 
forth. 
Some form of expungement of criminal records or similar relief is available in 46 states 
of our union, as discussed below at § VI of this paper.  One observer has uncovered a direct 
correlation between unemployment rates and state expungement laws.29  Although extremely 
rare, expungements are theoretically possible in certain federal circuits that have held that such 
motions may be entertained under their inherent equitable powers, as discussed below at § III, 
but not in other circuits.  As such, whether a onetime minor offender or a defendant proven 
innocent is permanently branded with the “scarlet letter” of a criminal record may depend upon 
where s/he was charged with the offense and whether s/he was charged in state or federal court.  
This is especially troubling since many state-level misdemeanors or equivalent (i.e., disorderly 
persons) offenses overlap with federal misdemeanors, and numerous felonies at the state level 
have nearly identical federal counterparts with which defendants can be charged.  The decision 
of which forum to charge a defendant is left entirely to the discretion of prosecutors, who may be 
driven by external pressures or sometimes make such decisions based on untoward motivations.  
For example, congressional and Justice Department investigations uncovered that federal 
prosecutors politically targeted Democrats and soft-pedaled investigations involving Republicans 
in certain federal districts during the presidency of George W. Bush.30 
                                                            
29 Marlin Bressi, The Link Between Unemployment and Expungement Laws (Nov. 15, 2011), 
http://voices.yahoo.com/the-link-between-unemployment-expungement-laws-10446717.html? 
cat=17. 
30 In 2008, the Inspector General of the United States Department of Justice and DOJ’s Office of 
Professional Responsibility released a report detailing a joint investigation into highly publicized 
9 
Considering that widespread disparities in federal criminal sentencing among geographic 
areas and attributes of the defendant gave rise to the federal sentencing guidelines as such 
disparities were viewed as anathema,31 it is equally unfair that defendants convicted of the same 
exact misdemeanor or cleared of the same charges and otherwise equally situated face totally 
different opportunities for clearing their names and redemption depending upon geography.   
The cases in § III of this paper make evident that even in those circuits that have found 
the elasticity of ancillary jurisdiction reaches expungement authority, defendants who have been 
acquitted of all charges were usually denied expungement.  Accordingly, unless charged with 
and cleared of offenses in a jurisdiction where the remedy is available, even innocent persons 
who were wrongfully accused are haunted by the allegations and associated stigma long after 
their exoneration in federal court.  The enactment of federal legislation uniformly providing an 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
allegations of politicization of federal prosecutors’ offices.  The investigation examined whether 
certain U.S. Attorneys were “removed for partisan political purposes, or to influence an 
investigation or prosecution, or to retaliate for their actions in any specific investigation or 
prosecution.”  OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AN INVESTIGATION 
INTO THE REMOVAL OF NINE U.S. ATTORNEYS IN 2006 1 (2008), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/s0809a/final.pdf.  The investigation uncovered “significant 
evidence that political partisan considerations were an important factor in the removal of several 
of the U.S. Attorneys.”  Id. at 325-26.  For example, the Inspector General “concluded that 
complaints from New Mexico Republican politicians and party activists about [U.S. Attorney for 
New Mexico David] Iglesias’s handling of voter fraud and public corruption cases caused his 
removal.”  Id.  Furthermore, “[t]he bigger scandal, however, almost surely involve[d] 
prosecutors still in office.  The Gonzales Eight were fired because they wouldn’t go along with 
the Bush administration’s politicization of justice.  But statistical evidence suggests that many 
other prosecutors decided to protect their jobs or further their careers by doing what the 
administration wanted them to do: harass Democrats while turning a blind eye to Republican 
malfeasance […resulting in] abuses of power that would have made Richard Nixon green with 
envy.”  Paul Krugman, Department of Injustice, N.Y. TIMES, March 9, 2007, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/09/opinion/09krugman.html. 
31 See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 365 (1989) (discussing the need to shift 
away from indeterminate sentencing and discretion to reduce disparities in upholding 
constitutionality of the Sentencing Commission under separation of powers principles). 
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expungement remedy for nonviolent, first-time offenders and defining its reach would go a long 
way toward resolving these inequities. 
 
III. Circuit split: federal courts’ inherent powers and ancillary jurisdiction to expunge 
criminal records 
Given the absence of federal legislation expressly authorizing courts to expunge criminal 
records except as discussed below at § III, federal courts have held that expungements 
nevertheless may be granted pursuant to a court’s inherent powers or subject to the exercise of 
ancillary jurisdiction.  However, as a result of a 1994 Supreme Court decision limiting ancillary 
jurisdiction in the lower courts, a circuit split exists as to whether expungements may be 
considered solely on equitable grounds. The Supreme Court twice passed on opportunities to 
resolve the discrepancy.32 
Federal courts have limited jurisdiction.  Their powers are limited to those “authorized by 
Constitution and statute.”33  Congress has provided, “The district courts of the United States shall 
have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses against the laws of 
the United States.”34  However, the courts’ reach includes inherent powers 1) derived  from 
Article III and grounded in the separation of powers concept, vesting in courts certain judicial 
powers “once Congress has created lower federal courts and demarcated their jurisdiction;”35 2) 
arising from the nature of the court or necessary for the courts to exercise other powers, such as 
                                                            
32 Rowlands v. United States, 127 S.Ct. 598 (2006) (cert. denied); United States v. Coloian, 128 
S. Ct. 377 (2007) (cert. denied). 
33 Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citing Willy v. Coastal 
Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 136-137 (1992); Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 
541 (1986)). 
34 18 U.S.C. § 3231. 
35 Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 563 (3rd Cir. 1985). 
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the contempt sanction to maintain order while administering justice;36 and 3) “rooted in the 
notion that a federal court, sitting in equity, possesses all of the common law equity tools of a 
Chancery Court (subject, of course, to congressional limitation) to process litigation to a just and 
equitable conclusion.”37  This inherent equitable power has been applied in several circuits to 
find judicial expungement authority.38 
Despite the limited jurisdiction of federal courts, the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction 
allows those courts to exercise jurisdiction over certain matters that would otherwise exceed their 
competence, if those matters are incidental to other matters properly being considered by those 
courts.39  The seminal Supreme Court decision demarcating ancillary jurisdiction was Kokkonen 
v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., which explained that courts have generally asserted ancillary 
jurisdiction for two purposes: 
(1) to permit disposition by a single court of claims that are, in 
varying respects and degrees, factually interdependent, […] and (2) 
to enable a court to function successfully, that is, to manage its 
proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its decrees.40 
 In Kokkonen, the Supreme Court in a 9-0 holding reversed the assertion of ancillary 
jurisdiction by both a district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals to enforce a 
settlement agreement disposing of an earlier lawsuit related to the termination of a general 
                                                            
36 Id. (citing Michaelson v. U. S. ex rel. Chicago, 266 U.S. 42, 65-66 (1924)). 
37 Eash, 757 F.2d at 564 (quoting ITT Community Development Corp. v. Barton, 569 F.2d 1351, 
1359 (5th Cir. 1978); cf. Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973) (courts enjoy inherent equitable 
powers)). 
38 See, e.g., Livingston v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 759 F.2d 74, 78 (D.C. Cir. 1985); United States 
v. Flowers, 389 F.3d 737, 739-40 (7th Cir. 2004). 
39 Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 378 (1994). 
40 Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379-80 (citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991) 
(asserting ancillary jurisdiction to order payment of adversary’s attorney fees as a misconduct 
sanction); United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 32, 34 (1812) (asserting ancillary jurisdiction to hold 
parties in contempt as means of maintaining order during courtroom proceedings)). 
12 
agency agreement.41  In delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Scalia rejected as overbroad 
dictum from a 1904 Supreme Court decision: “A bill filed to continue a former litigation in the 
same court…to obtain and secure the fruits, benefits and advantages of the proceedings and 
judgment in a former suit in the same court by the same or additional parties…or to obtain any 
equitable relief in regard to, or connected with, or growing out of, any judgment or proceeding at 
law rendered in the same court…is an ancillary suit.”42  However, Justice Scalia acknowledged 
that the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction was neither rigid nor precise.43 
 Based on the foregoing powers of the court, most circuits found jurisdiction to expunge 
criminal records on equitable grounds prior to Kokkonen, although several of those circuits never 
actually allowed an expungement to be granted.  However, several circuits have subsequently 
reversed course in light of Kokkonen, finding that ancillary jurisdiction no longer exists for 
expungement based solely on equitable grounds.  Specifically, Courts of Appeals in the First, 
Third, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have cited Kokkonen in declining to recognize ancillary 
jurisdiction over expungement motions on equitable grounds, as have district courts in the 
Eleventh Circuit.  Conversely, appellate authority in the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Tenth, 
and D.C. Circuits continues to recognize jurisdiction for expungement motions pursuant to the 
courts’ inherent powers. 
 
a. Circuits declining to consider motions to expunge based on equitable grounds under 
ancillary jurisdiction 
 The Court of Appeals to adopt this viewpoint most recently was the Sixth Circuit in 2010, 
which despite a dissent from the Chief Judge of the Circuit held that the District Court for the 
                                                            
41 Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 375. 
42 Id. at 378-79 (quoting Julian v. Central Trust Co., 193 U.S. 93, 113-14 (1904)). 
43 Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379. 
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Eastern District of Michigan correctly declined to exercise ancillary jurisdiction over the 
expungement motion of an acquitted defendant’s arrest record.44  In Lucido, a money manager 
had been charged with sundry money laundering and conspiracy crimes in two indictments that 
were 17 and 18 years old, respectively.45  Lucido was granted a judgment of acquittal by the 
district judge in the first indictment, and he was acquitted of all charges against him by a jury in 
the second indictment.46  Despite being totally cleared in both cases, records of his indictment 
continued to haunt Lucido in a Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) database, 
which damaged his investment management business and impaired his post-acquittal success in 
society.47 
The Sixth Circuit analysis immediately dispensed of the first purpose of ancillary 
jurisdiction prescribed by Kokkonen and focused on the second purpose: “to enable a court to 
function successfully, that is, to manage its proceedings, vindicate its authority, and effectuate its 
decrees.”48  To that end, a majority of the panel wrote, “These criminal cases have long since 
been resolved, and there is nothing left to manage, vindicate or effectuate,”49 and therefore, the 
court’s consideration of the expunction of records was not ancillary to the already-concluded 
cases giving rise to the request. 
The Sixth Circuit’s holding in Lucido modified its own pre-Kokkonen precedent in 
United States v. Doe, where it had noted, “[i]t is within the inherent equitable powers of a federal 
                                                            
44 United States v. Lucido, 612 F.3d 871, 872-73 (6th Cir. 2010). 
45 Id. at 873. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 874 (citing Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 379-80). 
49 Lucido, 612 F.3d at 875. 
14 
court to order the expungement of a record in an appropriate case,”50 as well as one post-
Kokkonen decision in United States v. Carey, 602 F.3d 738, 740 (6th Cir. 2010), reh’g denied 
(May 17, 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 322 (U.S. 2010). 
 A similar analysis appeared in the relevant First Circuit precedent in United States v. 
Coloian, where an attorney and former Chief of Staff to the Mayor of Providence, Rhode Island, 
sought to expunge records of a corruption indictment in which Mr. Coloian was totally 
exonerated by a jury.51  Coloian asserted that the existence of the arrest and indictment records, 
notwithstanding his acquittal, harmed his ability to practice law and otherwise conduct 
business.52  The First Circuit considered the circuit split and joined the Third, Eighth, and Ninth 
Circuits, holding, “Kokkonen forecloses any ancillary jurisdiction to order expungement based 
on Coloian's proffered equitable reasons.”53  As a result, no expungement of criminal records is 
available on equitable grounds within the First Circuit. 
 In Dunegan, the Third Circuit considered a retired police officer’s petition to expunge 
nearly 30-year-old charges for violating a suspect’s civil rights in an accidental shooting.54  As in 
Coloian and Lucido, the retired officer had been acquitted of the charges, and no record of 
conviction existed.  However, since Dunegan had not alleged unlawful arrest or conviction or 
“Constitutional or statutory infirmity in the underlying criminal proceedings,” the district court 
                                                            
50 United States v. Doe, 556 F.2d 391, 393 (6th Cir. 1977). 
51 United States v. Coloian, 480 F.3d 47, 48 (1st Cir. 2007). 
52 Id. at 49. 
53 Id. at 52. 
54 United States v. Dunegan, 251 F.3d 477, 478 (3d Cir. 2001). 
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did not have jurisdiction to expunge a criminal record, whether of an acquittal or conviction.55  
This view was upheld in United States v. Rowlands, 451 F.3d 173, 178 (3d Cir. 2006).56 
 The Eighth Circuit also backpedaled on the issue of subject matter and ancillary 
jurisdiction in the wake of Kokkonen.  Previously, the Eighth Circuit had held, “[c]onsistent with 
other circuits, that a federal court may exercise its inherent equitable powers by ordering the 
Attorney General to expunge criminal records in a particular case, provided that the case presents 
extraordinary circumstances warranting such an exercise of the court’s equitable power.”57  But 
the Court of Appeals applied Kokkonen to narrow its definition of ancillary jurisdiction in Meyer.  
In that case, the panel found that Meyer, a pro se petitioner employed in the securities industry 
who 18 years earlier had pled guilty to a single count of failing to file income tax returns and 
served probation, “sought expungement based solely on the equitable considerations that his 
employer was insured by the FDIC and that FDIC regulations restricted the employment of 
individuals previously convicted of certain criminal offenses.  Meyer did not allege that his 
misdemeanor conviction was in any way invalid or illegal nor did he rely on any Constitutional 
provision or statute authorizing either a district court or magistrate judge to expunge his criminal 
                                                            
55 Id. at 480. 
56 David Rowlands, unlike the petitioners in Coloian, Dunegan, and Lucido, sought to expunge a 
record of conviction.  Twenty-four years prior to bringing the expungement petition, 
Rowlands—a former Councilman and Mayor of Kearny, New Jersey—had been convicted of 
conspiring to obstruct and delay interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951, 
knowingly attempting to obstruct and delay interstate commerce by extortion, in violation of 18 
U.S.C. § 1951-52, and knowingly attempting to influence and obstruct a federal grand jury 
investigation, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503.  Despite being sentenced to eight years in prison, 
Rowlands was released after serving 10 months after two federal prosecutors urged the court to 
reduce his sentence because of significant post-sentencing cooperation.  Two decades later, 
despite having letters of support from both Assistant U.S. Attorneys who had prosecuted him and 
boasting a lengthy post-conviction history of productivity, community service, and making 
amends, Rowlands remained unable to have his teaching certificate reinstated by the State Board 
of Examiners as a result of his decades-old conviction.  Rowlands, 451 F.3d at 175. 
57 Geary v. United States, 901 F.2d 679, 680 (8th Cir. 1990) (citing United States v. Doe, 859 
F.2d 1334 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. McMains, 540 F.2d 387 (8th Cir. 1976)). 
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conviction.”58  Finding that the proposed exercise of ancillary jurisdiction did not comport with 
the second of the two purposes in Kokkonen, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and 
vacated the District Court’s order of expungement of Mr. Meyer’s arrest and conviction.59 
 For the same reasons, the Ninth Circuit declared that district courts lack ancillary 
jurisdiction to expunge criminal records based on equitable considerations, holding that the 
“expungement of an accurate record of a valid arrest and conviction necessarily disrupts [the 
Tenth Amendment’s] balance of power and, in doing so, violates the principles of federalism 
upon which our system is founded.”60  Basing its opinion on Kokkonen insofar as it concerned 
the ancillary jurisdiction purpose of managing proceedings, vindicating authority, and 
effectuating decrees, the Court of Appeals noted, “Expungement of a criminal record solely on 
equitable grounds, such as to reward a defendant's rehabilitation and commendable post-
conviction conduct, does not serve any of those goals.”61 
 The present state of the law is unclear in the Eleventh Circuit, where the Court of 
Appeals has not considered the issue since Justice Scalia authored the Supreme Court opinion in 
Kokkonen but several district courts within the circuit have adopted the view that ancillary 
jurisdiction does not exist to consider expungement motions solely on equitable grounds.62  
                                                            
58 United States v. Meyer, 439 F.3d 855, 861 (8th Cir. 2006). 
59 Id. at 863. 
60 United States v. Sumner, 226 F.3d 1005, 1014 (9th Cir. 2000) (affirming dismissal of 
expungement motion for want of jurisdiction where Thomas Sumner, a substitute teacher seeking 
permanent certification as a teacher, petitioned to expunge a nearly 30-year-old conviction for 
unlawful possession of narcotics in Yosemite National Park while in his youth and was 
sentenced to 90 days of probation and a $100 fine). 
61 Id. 
62 “Despite the circuit split, this court is comfortable that the Eleventh Circuit would follow the 
post-Kokkonen theory discussed above and not the theory applied by other circuits not 
discussed.”  United States v. Paxton, 2007 WL 2081483, at *2 (M.D. Ala. July 20, 2007).  See 
also Hall v. Alabama, 2010 WL 582076, at *8 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 18, 2010). 
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However, since all Fifth Circuit decisions that predate October 1, 1981, have precedential 
authority on courts of the Eleventh Circuit,63 other district courts within the circuit are free to 
adopt the view of the circuits finding that the elasticity of ancillary jurisdiction reaches equitable 
expungements, in accord with pre-1981 Fifth Circuit holdings that have not been abrogated.64 
Unlike the Sixth Circuit decision, which seems to have foreclosed judicial federal 
expungements entirely, the First, Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have left open the possibility 
that courts may nevertheless have ancillary jurisdiction to expunge certain records on other than 
equitable grounds, “in extraordinary cases to preserve its ability to function successfully by 
enabling it to correct an injustice caused by an illegal or invalid criminal proceeding.”65  “When 
we refer to ‘equitable grounds,’ we mean grounds that rely only on notions of fairness and are 
entirely divorced from legal considerations […] [E]xpungement of a criminal record ‘solely on 
equitable grounds, such as to reward a defendant's rehabilitation and commendable post-
conviction conduct’ did not serve the purposes of ancillary jurisdiction as articulated in 
Kokkonen, and…‘a district court's ancillary jurisdiction is limited to expunging the record of an 
unlawful arrest or conviction, or to correcting a clerical error.’”66  At present, the distinction 
seems purely academic.  This writer was unable to locate a single district court within these 
circuits that has actually granted an expungement since Kokkonen. 
                                                            
63 Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc). 
64 See United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734, 747-50 (5th Cir. 1967) (granting expungement of 
state criminal records of African-Americans who were arrested by state law enforcement officers 
attempting to intimidate them against voting); Rogers v. Slaughter, 469 F.2d 1084, 1085 (5th Cir. 
1972) (acknowledging the power of the courts to expunge records but finding that the power “is 
one of exceedingly narrow scope” and vacating a lower court’s expungement order). 
65 Meyer, 439 F.3d at 860-62. 
66 Coloian, 480 F.3d at 51 (quoting Sumner, 226 F.3d at 1014-15.  See also Dunegan, 251 F.3d at 
480 (holding that district courts do not have jurisdiction over expungement motions based on 
equitable grounds, but declining to decide “whether a record may be expunged on the basis of 
Constitutional or statutory infirmity in the underlying criminal proceedings or on the basis of an 
unlawful arrest or conviction”). 
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b. Circuits recognizing jurisdiction for expungement motions brought solely on 
equitable grounds 
Unlike the circuits in the foregoing section, in six other circuits, Court of Appeals 
precedents continue to allow district courts to exercise jurisdiction to consider motions to 
expunge criminal records solely on equitable grounds.  In the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, 
Tenth, and D.C. Circuits, the courts’ inherent equitable powers vindicate such authority. 
Since Kokkonen’s narrowing of ancillary jurisdiction, the Seventh Circuit reaffirmed its 
pre-Kokkonen holding that “[D]istrict courts do have jurisdiction to expunge records maintained 
by the judicial branch” (but not for Executive Branch records) and ancillary jurisdiction over 
judicial expungements arises out of the federal courts’ inherent equitable powers.67  Courts in the 
Seventh Circuit must apply a balancing test: “if the dangers of unwarranted adverse 
consequences to the individual outweigh the public interest in maintenance of the records, then 
expunction is appropriate.”68  The Court of Appeals elaborated on the balancing test in Flowers: 
[E]xpungement is, in fact, an extraordinary remedy…“unwarranted 
adverse consequences” must be uniquely significant in order to 
outweigh the strong public interest in maintaining accurate and 
undoctored records.  We will turn first to the second part of the 
test: the public interest in maintaining accurate records.  That 
interest is strong as evidenced by the statutory admonition found in 
28 U.S.C. § 534 which requires the Department of Justice to 
collect criminal records and make them available to state and local 
law enforcement agencies.  Records relating to a person’s criminal 
conduct are vital tools to law enforcement and are…essential to the 
computation of sentences under the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines.  Other evidence of the weight of the public interest can 
be seen in the long tradition of open proceedings and public 
records, which is the essence of a democratic society. 
 
                                                            
67 United States v. Flowers, 389 F.3d 737, 739 (7th Cir. 2004).  See also United States v. 
Kotsiris, 543 F. Supp. 2d 966, 969-70 (N.D. Ill. 2008). 
68 United States v. Janik, 10 F.3d 470, 472 (7th Cir. 1993) (prescribing a balancing test for 
expungement of judicial records but foreclosing judicial expungement of records in possession of 
the Executive Branch). 
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To outweigh that interest, “unwarranted adverse consequences” 
must truly be extraordinary.  The phrase does not refer to adverse 
consequences which attend every arrest and conviction.  Those are 
unfortunate but generally not considered unwarranted adverse 
consequences.  It is possible, even likely, that any person with an 
arrest or conviction record may well be impeded in finding 
employment.  As the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has 
stated, if employment problems resulting from a criminal record 
were “sufficient to outweigh the government's interest in 
maintaining criminal records, expunction would no longer be the 
narrow, extraordinary exception, but a generally available 
remedy.”69 
 
 It should be noted that although the Court of Appeals in Flowers recognized jurisdiction 
to expunge on equitable grounds, a lower court’s grant of expungement was reversed and 
vacated because Flowers had not demonstrated that the balancing test weighed in favor of 
expungement.70  Consequently, Katherine Ann Flowers, a recently graduated practical nurse and 
Lieutenant in her local fire department, was unable to expunge an 8-year-old one-count 
conviction for violating 42 U.S.C. § 3631(b)(1) (“interfering with housing rights on account of 
race”).71 
 Pre-Kokkonen precedent also remains undisturbed within the D.C. Circuit.  “The judicial 
remedy of expungement is inherent and is not dependent on express statutory provision.”72  
Further, “courts have the inherent, equitable power to expunge arrest records…expungement can 
and should be ordered ‘when that remedy is necessary and appropriate in order to preserve basic 
legal rights.’”73  In Livingston, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals called for a balancing of the 
                                                            
69 Flowers, 389 F.3d at 739-40 (quoting United States v. Smith, 940 F.2d 395, 396 (9th Cir. 
1991)). 
70 Flowers, 389 F.3d at 738. 
71 Id. 
72 Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
73 Livingston v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 759 F.2d 74, 78 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (quoting Sullivan v. 
Murphy, 478 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880 (1973)). 
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equities and “a logical relationship between the injury and the requested remedy.”74  The court 
noted the need to consider expungements based on the necessities of each case, emphasizing 
“flexibility rather than rigidity…[retaining] the qualities of mercy and practicality [that] have 
made equity the instrument for nice adjustment and reconciliation.”75 
 The Second Circuit likewise rejected arguments by the government that district courts 
lack ancillary jurisdiction to hear expungement motions.76  Uniquely, the Second Circuit found 
that applying ancillary jurisdiction to expungement cases – even where based solely on equitable 
considerations – fell “within the policy of encouraging judicial economy.”77  Nevertheless, the 
Second Circuit limited the relief to extreme circumstances, the finding of which should involve a 
“‘delicate balancing of the equities between the right of privacy of the individual and the right of 
law enforcement officials to perform their necessary duties.’”78  Although the Court of Appeals 
expressed its view over three decades ago, it has declined to reconsider in the aftermath of the 
Kokkonen decision, and district courts within the circuit have agreed that federal courts remain 
vested with inherent equitable powers to expunge criminal records.79 
 The Fourth Circuit followed the view of Schnitzer in Allen v. Webster, which has not 
been abrogated by the Court of Appeals since Kokkonen and remains good law within the 
                                                            
74 Livingston, 759 F.2d at 78. 
75 Id. 
76 United States v. Schnitzer, 567 F.2d 536, 538 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 907 
(1978). 
77 Id. 
78 Schnitzer, 567 F.2d at 539 (quoting United States v. Rosen, 343 F.Supp. 804, 806-7 (S.D.N.Y. 
1972)). 
79 See, e.g., Melendez v. United States, 2012 WL 3614605 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 21, 2012); United 
States v. Rabadi, 889 F. Supp. 757, 759 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); United States v. Daisley, 2006 WL 
3497855 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 5, 2006). 
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circuit.80  However, several district courts within the Fourth Circuit have declined to follow Allen 
in favor of the no-ancillary-jurisdiction view of the First, Third, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth 
Circuits, noting that the Court of Appeals has not spoken to the issue since the Supreme Court 
narrowed ancillary jurisdiction in Kokkonen.81 
 The Tenth Circuit has stated, following Kokkonen, “[i]t is well settled in this circuit that 
courts have inherent equitable authority to order the expungement of an arrest record or a 
conviction in rare or extreme instances.”82  The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has exercised 
ancillary jurisdiction to find this authority.83 However, the Tenth Circuit has applied a 
heightened standard to attempts to expunge convictions of persons “adjudged as guilty in a court 
of law” vis-à-vis expungements of arrest records of a “presumably innocent person.”84  
                                                            
80 Allen v. Webster, 742 F.2d 153, 154-55 (4th Cir. 1984). 
81 See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 847 F. Supp. 2d 828 (D. Md. 2012) (denying expungement 
of a 8-year-old misdemeanor conviction for possessing a small amount of cocaine on equitable 
grounds due to lack of federal ancillary jurisdiction, noting the Fourth Circuit’s holding in Allen 
predated Kokkonen); United States v. Mitchell, 683 F. Supp. 2d 427, 432 (E.D. Va. 2010) 
(finding no ancillary jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 “because the act of entering judgment 
of conviction in defendant’s criminal case divests a district court of original jurisdiction over 
defendant’s case” and distinguishing from Allen); United States v. Gary, 206 F. Supp. 2d 741 (D. 
Md. 2002) (making no mention of Allen but citing the Ninth Circuit decision in Sumner in 
finding no ancillary jurisdiction to expunge solely for equitable considerations and claiming 
there is no direct authority in the Fourth Circuit on the issue). 
82 Camfield v. City of Oklahoma City, 248 F.3d 1214, 1234 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing pre-
Kokkonen holdings in United States v. Pinto, 1 F.3d 1069, 1070 (10th Cir. 1993) and United 
States v. Linn, 513 F.2d 925, 927 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975)).  See also 
United States v. Friesen, 853 F.2d 816 (10th Cir. 1988) (trial court could not exercise its 
discretion to order expungement of arrest without a factual showing of harm or extreme 
circumstances). 
83 Id. 
84 Pinto, 1 F.3d at 1070 (holding federal trial courts are without power to expunge a conviction 
that was in no way alleged to be invalid and defendant was only being harmed by the natural and 
intended collateral consequences of conviction). 
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Nevertheless, the fact that a defendant was acquitted was not “in itself sufficient to require the 
trial court to expunge his record of arrest.”85 
 The Fifth Circuit has famously proclaimed, “Public policy requires … that the retention 
of records of the arrest and of the subsequent proceedings be left to the discretion of the 
appropriate authorities.  The judicial editing of history is likely to produce a greater harm than 
that sought to be corrected.”86  Nevertheless, post-Kokkonen, that Court of Appeals has asserted 
inherent equitable powers under its ancillary jurisdiction to uphold an expungement of judicial 
records upon a mere showing that the existence of the records burdened the petitioner, where a 
conviction had been overturned.87  In the seminal Fifth Circuit case, a former federal law 
enforcement officer whose 1986 wire fraud and conspiracy convictions had been set aside sought 
expungement of the records of the arrest and overturned convictions.88  The Fifth Circuit noted 
that federal courts have supervisory powers over judicial records, and the government had not 
challenged the expungement order as it pertained to such records.89  However, the panel reversed 
the district court’s expungement of Executive Branch records.  In doing so, the Fifth Circuit 
opined that the Janik court in the Seventh Circuit had gone too far in foreclosing the 
expungement remedy against the Executive Branch, noting: 
First, courts—not legislatures—have historically crafted remedies 
when a claimant has demonstrated that his rights have been 
violated. […] In the main, courts have not restrained their remedial 
powers on account of the wrongdoers’ affiliation with the 
executive branch. […] More importantly for our purposes, our 
circuit has employed the expungement remedy before—in the 
                                                            
85 Linn, 513 F.2d at 928. 
86 Rogers v. Slaughter, 469 F.2d 1084, 1085 (5th Cir. 1972). 
87 Sealed Appellant v. Sealed Appellee, 130 F.3d 695, 697 (5th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 
1077 (1998). 
88 Id. at 696. 
89 Id. at 697. 
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absence of specific congressional permission—when no other 
remedy existed to vindicate important legal rights.90 
 
 Nevertheless, the court adopted a narrower jurisdictional test than its sister circuits that 
had found inherent equitable powers to expunge; to wit, the standard adopted in Sealed Appellant 
was that the party “seeking expungement against executive agencies must assert an affirmative 
rights violation by the executive actors holding the records of the overturned conviction.”91  
Since the petitioner had not made a specific showing that any government agency was using 
adverse information to harm the petitioner, the standard for invoking the expungement remedy 
against the Executive Branch had not been satisfied and the order of expungement was reversed 
as against the FBI.92 
 Although federal courts in the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits 
have asserted ancillary jurisdiction to consider expungement motions on equitable grounds, 
giving the appearance that the balancing test could afford ex-offenders or exonerated defendants 
in these circuits a fighting chance to clear their records, the above cases make clear that the test 
rarely tips in favor of expungement.  Occasionally, a bold district court has granted an 
expungement of criminal records in one of the circuits permitting ancillary jurisdiction to be 
exercised. 
 Within the Second Circuit, Senior District Judge Pettine ordered the FBI to expunge 15-
year-old investigative and arrest records of a petitioner who had been arrested at the age of 21 on 
an extortion charge based on nothing but an angry letter written out of youthful impetuosity to a 
liquor store owner who refused to sell him beer just after his twenty-first birthday.93  The grand 
                                                            
90 Id. at 698-99 (citations omitted). 
91 Id. at 699. 
92 Id. at 702. 
93 Natwig v. Webster, 562 F. Supp. 225 (D.R.I. 1983). 
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jury refused to indict the then-21-year-old, and he went on to become an accomplished 
economist.  Nevertheless, the record of the arrest – despite the lack of conviction – had stymied 
his advancement in a government contractor role that required a security clearance and 
threatened his ability to emigrate to Australia.94  As Judge Pettine eloquently wrote: 
The plaintiff is an accomplished economist. He has not been 
involved with the criminal justice system in any way since the 
folly of his youth. For this Court to insist under these 
circumstances that the government’s general need in preserving 
arrest records outweighs the harm caused by maintaining the 
plaintiff’s record would result in a grave injustice—the evils of 
bureaucracy and inflexibility would triumph over the virtues of 
individuality and personal growth. In a fundamental way 
expungement in this case protects what Justice Brandeis termed the 
“right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of rights and right 
most valued by civilized men.”95 
 The Chief Judge of the Eastern District of Wisconsin, within the Seventh Circuit, granted 
an unopposed motion to expunge the 12-year-old criminal records of an attorney who had been 
arrested on a federal mail fraud charge that was subsequently dismissed.96  Within the Fourth 
Circuit, an Eastern District of Virginia judge found after asserting the court’s inherent equitable 
powers that the balancing test required expungement where a young, aspiring Washington 
businessman was totally innocent and had been mistakenly charged in a cocaine distribution 
conspiracy but faced obstacles to secure bank loans and government contracts, notwithstanding 
the dismissal of the charges against him.97 
 More recently, the District of Utah relied on the Tenth Circuit’s balancing test referenced 
in Linn and expunged the conviction records of a railroad worker and married father of three 
                                                            
94 Id. at 226. 
95 Natwig, 562 F. Supp. at 231 (citing Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928)). 
96 United States v. Bohr, 406 F. Supp. 1218 (E.D. Wis. 1976) (finding authority under the All 
Writs Act;  see § IV(b) below). 
97 United States v. Van Wagner, 746 F. Supp. 619, 621 (E.D. Va. 1990). 
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who had been charged with distribution of cocaine 20 years prior while a student at Weber State 
University. 98  A federal prosecutor supported the expungement petition, noting the government 
had no continuing need to retain the records, and the petitioner testified that background checks 
prevented him from coaching his children’s sports teams and stymied potential workplace 
promotions.99 
Since these three cases were the only ones this writer could locate since Kokkonen in 
which expungement was granted, these cases sadly represent exceptions rather than the norm.  
Even in these circuits where ancillary jurisdiction exists, orders granting expungement are 
usually as scarce as in the First, Third, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits.  The circuits in this 
section either have not revisited the issue since Kokkonen, or they have not viewed Kokkonen as 
precluding expungement authority in the court’s inherent equitable powers.  In sum, unlike the 
circuits discussed in § III(a), these other circuits do continue to find ancillary jurisdiction for 
expungement solely on equitable grounds. 
Twenty-four years after pleading guilty to conspiring to obstruct and delay interstate 
commerce, a former New Jersey mayor who went on to serve the public in noteworthy ways and 
never committed another crime was unable to have his teaching certificate reinstated, despite the 
pleas of both federal prosecutors and the federal judge in his case who insisted he had made 
amends.100 A money manager cleared of all charges in money laundering and conspiracy 
indictments continued to suffer harm to his reputation and investment management business two 
decades after the acquittals, but he was nevertheless denied expungement.101  An exonerated 
                                                            
98 United States v. Williams, 582 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1346 (D. Utah 2008). 
99 Id. 
100 Rowlands, 451 F.3d at 175. 
101 Lucido, 612 F.3d at 872-73. 
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attorney and mayoral Chief of Staff was likewise ineligible for the relief.102  A retired police 
officer cleared of civil rights violations in an accidental shooting could not expunge the records 
30 years later,103 and neither could a law-abiding securities industry employee who had 
committed a single misdemeanor 18 years earlier.104  Therefore, whether or not filing in a circuit 
that recognizes ancillary jurisdiction over expungement of criminal records, a petitioner seeking 
such relief is not likely to find it in the federal courts. 
 
IV. Expungements pursuant to federal statutes 
a. Expungement powers expressly granted by statutes 
Although Congress has not enacted federal expungement legislation mirroring remedies 
available in most states, offenders may be eligible for limited expungements under narrow 
circumstances based on certain statutes.  One circumstance where Congress has explicitly 
granted expungement authority to the Judicial Branch is where an offender was under 21 years 
old at the time of a single offense involving possession of a small, “personal use” amount of 
certain controlled substances in violation of the Controlled Substances Act,105 and the defendant 
was granted pre-judgment probation (wherein the District Court dismissed the proceedings 
without entering a judgment of conviction prior to the expiration of a term of probation).  In such 
cases: 
The expungement order shall direct that there be expunged from all 
official records, except the nonpublic records referred to in 
subsection (b), all references to his arrest for the offense, the 
institution of criminal proceedings against him, and the results 
thereof.  The effect of the order shall be to restore such person, in 
the contemplation of the law, to the status he occupied before such 
                                                            
102 Coloian, 480 F.3d at 48-49. 
103 Dunegan, 251 F.3d at 478. 
104 Meyer, 439 F.3d at 861. 
105 21 U.S.C. § 844. 
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arrest or institution of criminal proceedings.  A person concerning 
whom such an order has been entered shall not be held thereafter 
under any provision of law to be guilty of perjury, false swearing, 
or making a false statement by reason of his failure to recite or 
acknowledge such arrests or institution of criminal proceedings, or 
the results thereof, in response to an inquiry made of him for any 
purpose.106 
 
 When an expungement is granted pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3607(c), the Department of 
Justice retains a sealed, nonpublic record of the conviction, “solely for the purpose of use by the 
courts in determining in any subsequent proceeding whether a person qualifies for the 
disposition” provided in the statute.107   
 Congress has also directed the Executive Branch to expunge its own records in limited 
instances.  For example, the statute authorizing the FBI to create an index of DNA identification 
records of federal criminal defendants and convicts contains a provision requiring the Director of 
the FBI to expunge the DNA analyses of persons whose charges are dismissed or whose 
convictions are overturned.108  The statute authorizing the Department of Defense to collect and 
index DNA samples of service members convicted of qualifying military offenses contains an 
analogous provision requiring the expungement of the DNA analyses of military personnel 
whose convictions are overturned.109 
Congress has also authorized the Secretary of Veterans Affairs to expunge records related 
to disciplinary matters involving the professional conduct or competence of Veterans Health 
Administration employees, where a Disciplinary Appeals Board has recommended such a 
remedy in resolving a disciplinary question.110  Separately, Executive Branch agencies have 
                                                            
106 18 U.S.C.A. § 3607(c) (West).  See also 21 U.S.C.A. § 844a(j) (West). 
107 18 U.S.C.A. § 3607(b) (West). 
108 42 U.S.C.A. § 14132(d) (West). 
109 10 U.S.C.A. § 1565(e) (West). 
110 38 U.S.C.A. § 7462(d)(1) (West). 
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administrative procedures in place pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552a that permit individuals who are 
subjects of inaccurate government records to request correction of those records. 
 
b. Expungement powers implicit in statutes 
 Ex-offenders have creatively resorted to other statutes that do not mention expungement 
to seek relief, mostly without success.  In Carey, a defendant who had years earlier pled guilty to 
a one-count Information for conducting an illegal gambling business, served one year or 
probation without incident, and led a commendable, law-abiding post-conviction life, brought a 
motion to expunge his criminal records under the Federal Gun Control Act and asserted before 
the Sixth Circuit that the motion’s denial violated his Second Amendment right to bear arms, in 
turn violating his Fifth Amendment rights under the Equal Protection and Due Process clauses.111  
Carey argued that the expungement would have restored his right to possess or carry a firearm 
and its denial therefore infringed upon a fundamental right.112 Carey further asserted that 
congressional passage of the Federal Gun Control Act’s reference to expunged records implied 
an expungement remedy for federal convictions.113 
 However, the Supreme Court had previously upheld “longstanding prohibitions on the 
possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill […and] laws forbidding the carrying of 
firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings […and] or laws imposing 
conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”114  Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit 
                                                            
111 Carey, 602 F.3d at 740-41. 
112 Id. 
113 18 U.S.C.A. § 921(a)(20) (West) (“Any conviction which has been expunged, or set aside or 
for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored shall not be considered a 
conviction for purposes of this chapter, unless such pardon, expungement, or restoration of civil 
rights expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms.”). 
114 Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 571 (2008). 
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held, it follows that Carey’s inability to obtain an expungement did not violate a constitutional 
right, and the Federal Gun Control Act – while not precluding expungements of valid 
convictions and while disallowing expunged convictions to interfere with the right to bear arms – 
conferred no authority on the courts to grant such expungements.115 
 As an alternative to the inherent equitable powers discussed above at § III, petitioners 
have also asserted that courts enjoy a statutory conferral of expungement authority under the All 
Writs Act.116  One petitioner in the Third Circuit articulately averred: 
The United States Supreme Court … has clearly held that lower 
federal courts may perform acts without an express statutory bases 
pursuant to their general authority to issue common law writs 
under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 […which] grants federal 
courts the power to “issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid 
of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and 
principles of law.” […] See also United States v. Ayala, 894 F.2d 
425, 428 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (explaining that the All Writs Act was 
designed to “fill the interstices of the federal post-conviction 
remedial framework”).  In other words, a federal court can take 
whatever action is necessary to achieve justice unless that 
particular action is prohibited by Congressional mandate.117 
One federal court agreed that the statute does empower federal courts to expunge 
criminal records.118  In granted an unopposed motion to expunge the 12-year-old criminal 
records of an attorney who had been arrested and cleared on a federal mail fraud charge, the 
Chief Judge of the Eastern District of Wisconsin cited the All Writs Act and held, “In the 
absence of a specific denial of power, this court may fully effectuate its jurisdiction and do 
complete justice in the cases before it. […] This plenary power undoubtedly includes the 
authority to order expunction of criminal records where circumstances demand such action. […] 
                                                            
115 Carey, 602 F.3d at 741-42. 
116 28 U.S.C. § 1651. 
117 (Rowlands Br. at *13-14, United States v. Rowlands, 2005 WL 6074972 (3d Cir. 2005).) 
118 Bohr, 406 F. Supp. at 1218. 
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The exercise of the power, however, is discretionary with the court, with the decision to expunge 
resting on the facts and circumstances of each case.”119 
 However, the Third and Tenth Circuits have rejected the reasoning in Bohr and proffered 
by Mr. Rowlands.  The Tenth Circuit disagreed with Bohr with a brief observation, “While we 
agree that the All Writs Act plays a part in enabling the court to issue the writs of error coram 
nobis and the writs of mandamus necessary to accomplish an actual expungement, we believe 
that the authority to consider the [expungement] issue in the first place is not contained in that 
Act.”120  The Third Circuit held that since it had previously concluded no subject matter existed 
to consider an expungement motion on equitable grounds, the All Writs Act could not empower 
the court to issue a writ to vindicate its jurisdiction.121 
Although the Third Circuit claimed in Rowlands that Bohr had been superseded by 
Flowers as the Eastern District of Wisconsin falls within the Seventh Circuit, a close reading of 
Flowers finds no analysis whatsoever as to the applicability of the All Writs Act, nor is the 
statute even mentioned in the decision.122  Indeed, while the Seventh Circuit found inherent 
equitable powers to expunge judicial records through the court’s ancillary jurisdiction and set 
forth a balancing test, the balancing test could be reconciled with Bohr as the rubric for a lower 
court’s determination of whether an expungement motion should be granted.  Nevertheless, a 
court may still derive the authority to expunge from the All Writs Act within the Seventh Circuit, 
until the Court of Appeals says otherwise. 
 
 
                                                            
119 Id. at 1219 (citations omitted). 
120 Pinto, 1 F.3d at 1070. 
121 Rowlands, 451 F.3d at 178-79.  See also § III(b) and Note 48 above. 
122 Flowers, 389 F.3d at 737. 
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V. Separation of powers: may the Judicial Branch order the expungement of Executive 
Branch records, and vice-versa? 
 Separation of powers principles derived from Articles I (establishing the Legislative 
Branch and vesting lawmaking power in Congress), II (establishing the Executive Branch and 
vesting “executive power” in the President), and III (establishing the Judicial Branch and vesting 
judicial power in the federal courts) of the United States Constitution reveal another circuit split 
pertaining to expungements that the Supreme Court has not resolved,123 creating another 
argument favoring the need for federal legislation to bring clarity and equity to the issue.124 
While several circuits and district courts have ordered, albeit rarely, the expungement of 
criminal records retained by the Executive Branch pursuant to their inherent equitable powers,125 
at least two circuits have held that to do so would violate separation of powers between the three 
branches of government.  Ironically, the Seventh Circuit – one of the most liberal circuits as 
concerning its interpretation of a district court’s equitable powers to expunge judicial criminal 
records – has held it is powerless to expunge Executive Branch records without a statute 
expressly conferring such authority on the Judiciary even before Kokkonen.126 “To obtain 
expungement of records maintained by the FBI or any other Executive Branch agency, [a 
petitioner] must go directly to the Executive Branch.  If the Executive Branch refuses, Congress 
can act to confer jurisdiction on the federal courts.”127  That Court of Appeals reiterated, 
“[F]ederal courts are without jurisdiction to order an Executive Branch agency to expunge what 
are admittedly accurate records of a person's indictment and conviction.  We are without 
                                                            
123 See Note 24. 
124 U.S. Const. art. I-III. 
125 See discussion at § III. 
126 Janik, 10 F.3d at 473. 
127 Id. 
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statutory or constitutional authority to hold otherwise. In fact, in Section 534, Congress 
suggested the opposite—that is, in favor of requiring the Executive Branch to maintain accurate 
records of such convictions.”128 
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Lucido found that to order the removal of 
FBI records of indictments resulting in acquittal “would amount to an extraordinary inter-branch 
incursion, one that should not lightly be effectuated through the federal courts' unexceptional 
right to oversee their own criminal cases.”129 
One scholar argued earlier this year that since (in her view) “[t]he federal courts’ 
ancillary jurisdiction does not stretch so far as to allow the judiciary to be able to encroach on the 
executive branch’s power by having the authority to expunge federal agency documents […], 
there should be an equitable expungement petition process through the FBI that will afford 
individuals the opportunity to have federally maintained records of arrest and indictments 
expunged.130  Ms. Wurie’s law journal comment goes on to propose a process by which 
individuals could petition the FBI’s Criminal Justice Information Services Division to have their 
criminal records contained within the Executive Branch expunged by the Justice Department 
itself.131 
This approach, while laudable for its ingenuity and intention of providing a mechanism 
for Executive Branch expungements under existing law, leaves much to be desired.  Putting in 
charge of expungement requests the very agency at the crux of most federal investigations and 
prosecutions – many of which were botched in those cases where defendants were acquitted but 
                                                            
128 Flowers, 389 F.3d at 738-39. 
129 Lucido, 612 F.3d at 875. 
130 Wurie, supra note 5, at 51-52. 
131 Id. 
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nevertheless denied expungement132 – creates a situation of the fox guarding the henhouse.  
Moreover, absolving the court system of involvement in overseeing expungement requests would 
deny petitioners any meaningful method of appealing arbitrary or capricious denials by the FBI’s 
appointed hearing officer. 
Even if the Sixth and Seventh Circuits are correct in their constrictive view that courts 
may not rely on their inherent equitable powers to order the expunction of Executive Branch 
criminal records in extreme cases, there is no disagreement about whether Congress may grant 
that authority to the courts.  “Consistent with separation of powers, Congress may delegate to 
judicial branch” additional authority that comports with the functions of the judiciary.133  Indeed, 
the Seventh Circuit has explicitly stated, “Congress can act” to confer such jurisdiction on the 
courts.134  Therefore, the legislation proposed by this paper would resolve the circuit split over 
ancillary jurisdiction as well as the circuit split over separation of powers.  Federal legislation 
would maintain oversight by neutral arbiters – federal courts – rather than requiring the approval 
of an Executive Branch investigative or prosecutorial agency. 
While the Supreme Court has never considered the issue, most circuits have followed the 
Third Circuit’s holding that the inverse situation – an Executive Branch order expunging judicial 
records – is precluded insofar as a presidential pardon does not expunge the subject conviction 
and the President may not order the Judicial Branch to expunge its records.135  The Supreme 
Court held in Ex Parte Garland: 
                                                            
132 See § III. 
133 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989). 
134 Janik, 10 F.3d at 473. 
135 United States v. Noonan, 906 F.2d 952 (3d Cir. 1990) (a draft violator who was a member of 
a group of such offenders pardoned en masse by President Carter asserted that his pardon 
operated as an expungement of his convictions.  See also United States v. Bays, 589 F.3d 1035 
(9th Cir. 2009) (Tallman, J., holding a pardon does not expunge the subject offense). 
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A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offence 
and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it 
releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that 
in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never 
committed the offence. If granted before conviction, it prevents 
any of the penalties and disabilities consequent upon conviction 
from attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties 
and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes 
him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and 
capacity.136 
 
However, a half-century after Garland, the Court held that acceptance of a pardon 
necessarily implies guilt.137  Reading the two decisions together and attempting to reconcile 
them, the Third Circuit found that a pardon amounted to “an executive prerogative of mercy, not 
of judicial record-keeping”138 and the President could not directly or indirectly expunge a 
Judicial Branch record using the pardon power, despite its constitutional basis.139 
The President could likely seal or destroy FBI, Department of Justice, or other Executive 
Branch records pertaining to a criminal arrest or conviction.  The Department of Justice opined 
to the United States Pardon Attorney under President Bush, “Pardons that address the innocence 
of the pardonee have not to date also commanded expungement of Executive Branch records of 
the offense. If a President chose simultaneously to issue a pardon and order the Executive Branch 
to expunge any such records, we believe that order would have the effect intended, subject to any 
                                                            
136 Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4. Wall.) 333, 381-82 (1866) (invalidating a statute requiring 
allegiance from Confederate attorneys seeking to appear before federal courts where a former 
Confederate lawyer and Senator had been pardoned by the President). 
137 Lahny R. Silva, Clean Slate: Expanding Expungements and Pardons for Non-Violent Federal 
Offenders, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 155, 179-84 (2010) (citing Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79 
(1915)). 
138 Noonan, 906 F.2d at 955. 
139 Id. 
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statutory constraints on executive record keeping.”140  However, a concurrent pardon and 
expungement order would necessarily operate as a secret pardon, lest the expungement lose its 
value to the ex-offender in search of redemption, and judicial records would be unaffected. 
The foregoing section illustrates that even if an ex-offender or exonerated defendant 
succeeds in obtaining a rare expungement order in the Sixth or Seventh Circuits, or if an ex-
offender obtains both a pardon and an expungement order from the President of the United 
States, such expungements would not serve to remove the deleterious disabilities associated with 
the petitioner’s criminal record since records of the charge(s) would subsist in the other branch.  
This only compounds the need for comprehensive federal expungement legislation.  
 
 
VI. State Expungement Laws 
 The failure of Congress to act has not precluded state legislatures from taking advantage 
of the moral, social, and economic benefits of enacting expungement legislation; indeed, 46 state 
legislatures have addressed expungement in some manner, as well as the legislatures of the 
District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.141  Of those states, 40 
states (nearly three-quarters of all states in our union) have statutes in effect permitting the 
expungement of arrest records, while 24 states permit expungements even after a conviction in 
certain circumstances.142 
                                                            
140 Michelle Boardman, Whether A Presidential Pardon Expunges Judicial & Executive Branch 
Records of A Crime, 30 OP. OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL, 2006 WL 6167045, at *5 (U.S.A.G. 
Aug. 11, 2006). 
141 LESLIE MCADOO, ET AL., CREATING AN EXPUNGEMENT STATUTE FOR THE DISTRICT OF 
COLUMBIA: A REPORT AND PROPOSED LEGISLATION 65-79 (2006), available at 
http://www.courtexcellence.org/uploads/publications/ 
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Twenty-eight states permit the individual whose records were expunged to deny their 
existence if asked, creating a legal fiction necessary to effectuate the purpose of the 
expungement and clear the person of the stigma and lifelong collateral consequences of the 
criminal record.143  In the states where statutes permit the eventual expungement of felony 
convictions, most have imposed a requirement of greater temporal distance between the 
successful completion of the sentence and the petition for expungement, ostensibly to allow 
petitioners sufficient time to demonstrate they have led law-abiding lives and the antisocial 
conduct was a one-off occurrence meriting the “judicial editing of history.”144  For example, in 
the case of a dismissal, acquittal, or vacated conviction, expungement relief may be available 
immediately (such as in Mississippi and New Jersey) or in as little as 30 days following 
dismissal (such as in Indiana).145 For misdemeanors or disorderly persons offenses, state statutes 
                                                            
143 ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 12.62.180 (West 2012); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-902, 903 (West 
2012); CAL. CODE REGS. TIT. 2, § 7287.4; CAL. LAB. CODE § 432.7 (West 2012); CAL. PENAL 
CODE § 667 (West 2012); CAL. PENAL CODE § 851.8 (West 2012); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-
72-308 (West 2012); DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 11, § 4374(E) (West 2012); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
943.0585(4), 943.059(4) (West 2012); HAW. REV. STAT. § 831-3.2 (West 2012); IL ST CH 775 § 
5/2-103 (West 2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2410(F) (West 2012); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
431.076, 510.300 (West 2012); LA. STAT. ANN. § 44:9 (West 2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. CH. 
276, § 100C (West 2012); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 10-109; MISS. CODE. ANN. § 99-15-57 
(West 2012); MO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 610.110 (West 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-146 
(West 2012); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:5 (West 2012) (referring to the expungement 
procedures as “annulment of criminal records” but having the same effect); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
2C:52-27; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 179.285 (West 2011); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 160.60 
(MCKINNEY); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.55 (West 2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 22, § 19 
(West 2012); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137.225 (West 2012); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 780-
119(B); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-1.3-4 (West 2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-40-108 (West 
2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-392.4 (West 2012); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-11-25 (West 2012). 
144 Rogers, 469 F.2d at 1085. 
145 See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:52-6 (West 2012) (providing immediate expungement 
following dismissal and expungement after 6 months following dismissal pursuant to a 
diversionary program); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 99-19-71 (West 2012); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-5-
5.5 (West) (if a defendant is not prosecuted or is the subject of dismissed charges, an acquittal, or 
a vacated conviction, that person may petition to limit disclosure of related records to criminal 
37 
may allow immediately expungement relief (as in Mississippi for first-time offenders)146 or 
require a waiting period following completion of the sentence ranging from 3 years (as in New 
Hampshire)147 to 5 years (as in Kentucky and New Jersey)148 to 10 years (as in Oklahoma).149  
But in states permitting expungement of a felony conviction, the mandatory waiting period 
extends to a minimum of 5 years in Mississippi and New Hampshire150 and could require 10 
years to have lapsed since completion of the sentence (as in New Jersey);151 15 years (as in 
Indiana and Massachusetts);152 or even 20 years (as in Oregon).153 
Further, most of the legislative bodies in states allowing expungement of felony 
convictions have (wisely) determined as a matter of policy that certain crimes – such as sex 
crimes, crimes involving child victims, and violent felonies – should never be sealed.  These 
crimes are more heinous, offenders are at a much higher risk of recidivism than other lower-risk 
offenders, and there may be a more compelling need for public availability of such records 
(particularly as regards sex offenses, where many states have passed measures requiring sex 
offender registration and protocols notifying residents when such an offender moves into the 
neighborhood).  In addition, motor vehicle offenses are usually ineligible for expungement to 
ensure accurate motor vehicle records and driver histories. 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
justice agencies.  Such relief may be granted 30 days following acquittal or dismissal or one year 
following vacation of the conviction.).   
146 MISS. CODE. ANN. § 99-19-71 (West 2012). 
147 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:5 (West 2012). 
148 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.078 (West 2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:52-3 (West 2012). 
149 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 18(10) (West 2012). 
150 MISS. CODE. ANN. § 99-19-71 (West 2012); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:5 (West 2012). 
151 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:52-3 (West 2012). 
152 IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-5-5 (West 2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 276, § 100A (West 
2012). 
153 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137.225(9)(a) (West 2012). 
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For example, the Arizona statute precludes the expungement of records of dangerous 
offenses (without further definition), sex crimes requiring registration or crimes for which there 
has been a finding of sexual motivation, all crimes involving a victim under 15 years of age, and 
certain motor vehicle offenses.154 Kentucky permits the expungement of only those misdemeanor 
convictions that did not involve sex offenses or a child victim;155 Mississippi limits expungement 
of felony convictions to six enumerated crimes;156 New Hampshire does not allow the 
expungement of convictions of violent crimes, crimes involving obstruction of justice, or 
offenses subject to an extended term of imprisonment;157 and the Ohio statute precludes the 
sealing of convictions of violent crimes, offenses involving child victims, and first or second 
degree felonies.158 
A minority of states allow for expungement of a sex offender’s conviction.  In New 
Hampshire, expungement of a felony conviction for sexual assault, felony indecent exposure, or 
lewdness is possible once 10 years has passed since the date of completion of the sentence, 
although violent crimes and offenses subject to an extended term of imprisonment are 
excluded.159 Massachusetts allows the sealing of sex offense convictions after 15 years following 
completion of the sentence, although level 2 or level 3 sex offenders are ineligible for the 
                                                            
154 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-907 (West 2012). 
155 KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.078 (West 2012). 
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relief.160  And although Indiana does not provide for outright expungement, its statute permits 
ex-offenders to petition the state police department to restrict access to the person’s limited 
criminal history so that only criminal justice agencies can access the information, once 15 years 
have passed since the person completed the sentence for the most recent conviction.161  The 
provision contains no statutory bar to expunging sex offenses.162 
One of the most comprehensive statutes, prescribing in detail the information to be 
submitted with the petition, the boundaries of the expungement order, and exactly which crimes 
are ineligible is New Jersey’s expungement law.163  In New Jersey, dismissed charges are 
eligible for expungement immediately after disposition. A conviction of a non-criminal 
disorderly persons or petty disorderly persons offense (the state’s equivalent of a misdemeanor) 
may be expunged after 5 years from completion of the sentence,164 while a conviction of an 
eligible crime (an indictable offense, the state’s equivalent of a felony) may be expunged after 10 
years from completion of the sentence.165 
New Jersey delineates specific crimes that are never eligible for expungement: criminal 
homicide, except death by auto; kidnapping; luring or enticing; human trafficking; aggravated 
sexual assault; aggravated criminal sexual contact; criminal sexual contact, if the victim is a 
minor; criminal restraint and false imprisonment, if the victim is a minor; robbery; arson and 
related offenses; endangering the welfare of a child by engaging in sexual conduct which would 
impair or debauch the morals of the child; endangering the welfare of a child; causing or 
                                                            
160 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 276, § 100A (West 2012). 
161 IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-5-5 (West 2012). 
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163 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:52-1, et seq. 
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permitting a child to engage in a prohibited sexual act; selling or manufacturing child 
pornography; perjury; false swearing; knowingly promoting the prostitution of the actor’s child; 
terrorism; producing or possessing chemical weapons, biological agents or nuclear or 
radiological devices; and conspiracies or attempts to commit such crimes.166  New Jersey also 
has a permanent bar for expungement of any convictions for crimes by public official who 
breached the public trust or drug dealers who transacted in large quantities of unlawful controlled 
substances.167 
 Of course, an expungement only serves the petitioner’s goal and societal aims if the order 
is complied with and the stigmatic information is not disseminated.  The electronic age and the 
widespread availability of criminal records on the Internet have complicated that purpose.  States 
with expungement statutes have set different penalties to prevent inadvertent disclosure or, worse 
yet, official misconduct.  The “teeth” behind an expungement statute may be criminal in nature 
(in instances of willful disclosure of an expunged record by a law enforcement or court official), 
civil (allowing an action for damages by an aggrieved party or the Attorney General), or 
unspecified.  In Massachusetts, public and private employers are not permitted to ask about or 
require the disclosure of expunged charges, and violators can be sued civilly by the Attorney 
General, but the statute does not fashion a private right of action.168  In Arizona and Rhode 
Island, an aggrieved party can recover civil damages from the discloser of expunged records.169  
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Failure to comply with the expungement statute in New Jersey, Ohio, and Virginia can subject 
the violator to criminal penalties.170 
 States differ in the procedures for expungement, types of eligible offenses, when 
expungements can be granted, and other conditions.  For the most part, however, it is clear that 
state legislatures have seen the unmistakable need to avoid hamstringing courts that desperately 
want to provide relief to ex-offenders in certain circumstances if they are empowered to do so.  
Alas, the U.S. Congress has yet to follow suit. 
 
 
VII. Proposed Legislation Authorizing Expungement of Federal Criminal Records 
 Two bills creating federal expungement authority were introduced in the current 
congressional session, but neither was able to proceed to consideration by the House Judiciary 
Committee, let alone advance to a floor vote.  On June 1, 2011, Rep. Charles B. Rangel, a 
prominent Democrat from New York, introduced the “Second Chance for Ex-Offenders Act of 
2011” together with Rep. Steve Cohen of Tennessee, Rep. Pete Stark of California, Rep. Alcee 
L. Hastings of Florida, Rep. Karen Bass of California, Rep. Corinne Brown of Florida, outgoing 
Rep. Edolphus Towns of New York, Rep. John Lewis of Georgia, and Rep. Jan Schakowsky of 
Illinois.171  Rep. Hank Johnson of Georgia and Rep. Hansen Clarke of Michigan both signed on 
as sponsors in May 2012.172  All eleven sponsors are Democrats. 
                                                            
170 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.35 (West 2012) (divulging sealed records constitutes a fourth 
degree misdemeanor); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-392.3 (West 2012) (disclosure of expunged 
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171 Second Chance for Ex-Offenders Act of 2011, H.R. 2065, 112th Cong. (2011). 
172 Additional Sponsors, 2012 WL 1719867, 158 CONG. REC. H2813-01, 112th Cong. (2012). 
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 The other bill that would create a federal expungement mechanism – the “Fresh Start Act 
of 2011” – was introduced on July 7, 2011, by Rep. Steve Cohen of Tennessee, together with 
Rep. Raul Grijalva of Arizona, Rep. Donald Payne of New Jersey,173 Rep. Jesse Jackson, Jr. of 
Illinois,174 Rep. Bob Filner of California, and Resident Commissioner Pedro Pierluisi of Puerto 
Rico.175  Like Rangel’s bill, all of the bill’s sponsors are Democrats.  Rep. Eleanor Holmes 
Norton of the District of Columbia signed onto the bill on November 14, 2012.176 
 Previous incarnations of both bills have been proposed by Congressman Cohen and 
Congressman Rangel, respectively, in previous congressional sessions without avail.177  The lack 
of bipartisan support in the sponsorship of either bill does not spell improved prospects for 
passage in a Republican-controlled House of Representatives.  Nevertheless, this section will 
compare both bills and combine certain provisions of the Second Chance for Ex-Offenders Act 
(hereafter the “Rangel bill”) and the Fresh Start Act (hereafter the “Cohen bill”) with worthy 
provisions of state expungement statutes to propose a new, model federal expungement law. 
 Both the Cohen and Rangel bills are incredibly broad in the offenses they would reach.  
Under both proposals, all nonviolent offenses – whether misdemeanors or serious felonies – 
would be eligible for expungement.  The Rangel proposal defines a “nonviolent offense” as any 
federal misdemeanor or felony “that does not have as an element of the offense the use of a 
                                                            
173 Mr. Payne is deceased but his son, Donald Payne, Jr., was sworn in to succeed him on 
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Facing Illness and Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2012, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/22/us/jackson-jr-to-resign-house-seat.html?_r=0.  
175 Fresh Start Act of 2011, H.R. 2449, 112th Cong. (2011). 
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Fresh Start Act of 2010, H.R. 5492, 111th Cong. (2010). 
43 
weapon or violence and which did not actually involve violence in its commission.”178  The 
Cohen proposal ties the term to a crime of violence as it is defined in the United States Code.179 
Both bills require the petitioner to be a first-time offender and preclude from eligibility 
individuals with prior criminal histories. Both bills would require all requirements of the 
sentence to be fulfilled prior to consideration of an expungement petition, including the payment 
of fines and restitutions; completion of any term of imprisonment, probation, or supervised 
release; and freedom from dependency or abuse of alcohol or controlled substances for at least 
one year, if required by the terms of the sentence.  The Rangel bill additionally imposes 
educational and community service requirements; a petitioner must have obtained a high school 
diploma or completed a high school equivalency program and completed at least one year of 
community service.180 
 Neither bill contains a provision concerning the expungement of records relating to 
charges that did not result in any conviction.  Neither bill speaks to the specific effect of 
expungements on immigration status or past disciplinary or adverse employment actions taken 
against offenders.  A federal expungement statute should consider all avenues in which criminal 
records may harm an exonerated defendant or one-time nonviolent offender long after the 
charges are brought and expressly ensure that the person is restored to their pre-arrest state. 
Both bills prescribe a procedure for the court to consider a petition for expungement, 
consider the recommendations of the United States Attorney in the local federal district to be 
submitted within 60 days, and “weigh the interests of the petitioner against the best interests of 
                                                            
178 Second Chance for Ex-Offenders Act of 2011, H.R. 2065, 112th Cong. § 3631(b) (2011). 
179 Fresh Start Act of 2011, H.R. 2449, 112th Cong. § 3631(b) (2011). 
180 Second Chance for Ex-Offenders Act of 2011, H.R. 2065, 112th Cong. § 3632 (2011). 
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justice and public safety.”181  Neither bill is instructive as to what factors a court should employ 
in the balancing test.  The Cohen bill would require an expungement petition to be granted if it 
is filed at least 7 years following completion of the sentence, unless the underlying offense of 
conviction required the petitioner to register as a sex offender or caused a victim to sustain a loss 
of $25,000 or more.182  Accordingly, a sex offender or the mastermind behind a massive Ponzi 
scheme would not be entitled to a mandatory expungement (at least 7 years following release 
from prison), but such an offender could see his/her entire record wiped clean through a 
discretionary expungement under either the Cohen or Rangel legislation. 
 The high risk of recidivism of certain classes of offenders and the greater need for public 
access to criminal records of sex offenders or fraudsters counsel in favor of a federal 
expungement bill that more closely mirrors most state expungement statutes and is less generous 
in its reach than the Cohen or Rangel proposals.  This would also increase the likelihood that the 
bill would garner additional support in both houses of Congress and eventually become law. 
As such, certain enumerated felonies should be ineligible for expungement.  The New 
Jersey statute is instructive in this regard; homicide, kidnapping, sex crimes, human trafficking 
crimes, child pornography, offenses involving underage victims, terrorism-related crimes, public 
corruption, and perjury could be delineated as ineligible for such relief.183 
Furthermore, a federal expungement statute should limit expungement as a matter of 
right to a one-time nonviolent misdemeanor conviction or charges that did not result in 
conviction.  The bill could authorize courts to employ the balancing test to determine whether a 
felon is deserving of the second chance provided by expungement relief on a case-by-case basis, 
                                                            
181 Fresh Start Act of 2011, H.R. 2449, 112th Cong. § 3633(c) (2011); Second Chance for Ex-
Offenders Act of 2011, H.R. 2065, 112th Cong. § 3633(b) (2011). 
182 Fresh Start Act of 2011, H.R. 2449, 112th Cong. § 3633(e) (2011). 
183 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:52-2 (West 2012). 
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but the bill should set forth the factors for a court to consider (such as time elapsed since the 
offense, the offender’s age at the time of the misconduct, the nature and seriousness of the 
offense, post-offense conduct and other evidence of rehabilitation, such as family life, vocation, 
education, and community service).  For felony convictions, the bill should impose a minimum 
waiting period following completion of sentence, such as 5 to 10 years.184  The bill should also 
permit expungements of investigative and arrest records following pretrial diversion or receipt of 
a presidential pardon.   
 Finally, the bill should address consequences of disclosure by combining civil liability 
with criminal exposure.  Both the Cohen and Rangel bills would create a federal misdemeanor of 
knowingly disclosing information related to an expunged conviction, similar to expungement 
statutes in New Jersey, Ohio, and Virginia.185  However, a private right of action should also be 
included to afford aggrieved parties a civil remedy against violators.186 
 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
The barriers to employment, education, housing, and government assistance abound for 
nonviolent ex-offenders despite their best efforts to reintegrate and reenter society.  A lawful 
permanent resident (green card holder) can even be deported for a first-time, nonviolent lapse in 
judgment.  The cases discussed in this paper reveal these collateral consequences can haunt 
people from all walks of life – from firefighters to politicians to lawyers to stockbrokers to 
physicians – and at all stages of their lives, from 20-somethings to septuagenarians.  However, 
                                                            
184 See, e.g., MISS. CODE. ANN. § 99-19-71 (West 2012); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:5 (West 
2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:52-3 (West 2012). 
185 See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.35 (West 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-392.3 (West 
2012); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:52-30 (West 2012). 
186 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4051; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-1.3-4 (West 2012). 
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all of their alleged offenses were nonviolent, and most of the petitioners were onetime offenders 
who had made a grave mistake that was out of character.  Many of these individuals were cleared 
of the allegations brought against them but continued to face suspicions of their guilt decades 
after proving their innocence. 
The inability of nonviolent ex-offenders to secure employment and become productive 
citizens also exacerbates our recidivism problem, which in turn contributes to the skyrocketing 
costs to taxpayers of supporting the world’s most overcrowded and expensive prison system.187  
But the barriers to reentry disappear – and the individual enjoys restoration of dignity and 
reputation – where a former defendant is able to seal or destroy his/her criminal record and is no 
longer forced to disclose its existence. 
The foregoing reasons explain why 46 states of our union, along with the District of 
Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands have enacted some form of 
expungement.  Considering the presumption of innocence that attaches to criminal proceedings 
as a hallmark of our democracy, it only seems fair that defendants who are cleared in court 
should be able to clear their names and reputations and the stigma of charges that are dismissed.  
It seems equally appropriate to allow – as half of all state legislatures have done – nonviolent 
one-time misdemeanants or low-level felons to ease their reentry or reap the rewards of years of 
law-abiding, productive life by forgiving them for an isolated (often youthful) transgression from 
the distant past. 
However, Congress has yet to act on repeated proposals by veteran members of the 
House of Representatives to create a uniform expungement remedy for individuals haunted by 
federal criminal records.  Consequently, good hearted, hard-working Americans with low-risk 
                                                            
187 See § II. 
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criminal records (who are otherwise equally situated) may or may not face difficulties in finding 
employment, prohibitions from state or federal vocational licenses or contractor opportunities, 
ineligibility from participating in foster care and adoption programs, a lifetime ban from food 
stamps and other federal assistance, ineligibility for federal student aid, and eviction from public 
housing, depending upon where the individual lives or committed the offense many years ago. 
As one scholar puts it, “A bedrock legal principle requires that similarly situated persons 
be treated similarly.  If a law fails, without reasonable justification, to treat those in similar 
situations with the same degree of reward or consequence, it is stricken.  As it relates to federal 
expungement, rather than the existence of unbalanced legislation, the madness in the method 
results from an absence of legislation, which causes an ex-offender’s opportunity to seek an 
expungement to depend largely on the jurisdiction where the crime was committed.”188 
Despite the lack of a federal expungement statute, Courts of Appeals in the Second, 
Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits have exercised ancillary jurisdiction to consider 
expungement motions on equitable grounds.  Nevertheless, district courts in those circuits have 
only granted expungements in a handful of cases, while Courts of Appeals in the First, Third, 
Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have refused to recognize jurisdiction to consider such motions 
at all.  A separate circuit split exists as to whether the courts may order the Executive Branch, 
which hosts the law enforcement agencies possessing the most problematic criminal records, to 
expunge its records even in the most extraordinary circumstances.  Where the Supreme Court has 
declined to resolve either circuit split, Congress must step in and extinguish the fog.  After all, 
federal courts have cried out for legislative action.189 
                                                            
188 Mouzon, supra note 4, at 45-46. 
189 See, e.g., Kotsiris, 543 F. Supp. 2d at 969-70 (“Congress, in its collective wisdom, could 
certainly make expungement of federal criminal records a ‘generally available remedy,’ but it 
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 The federal expungement legislation proposed in this paper does not provide hardened 
criminals an escape route from their past wrongdoing, nor does it pave a new road for such 
offenders to commit more crimes without the backdrop of their past misdeeds.  Expunged federal 
criminal records would be restored automatically if an offender returns to the error of his/her old 
ways, just like in the many states where expungements are available through comprehensive 
statutory frameworks. 
 However, making expungements of federal criminal records available by statute would 
serve laudable goals of criminal justice public policy. “Scripture informs [a] focus on 
rehabilitation and reintegration, offering many examples of restorative justice in which the Lord 
demands punishment and reparations for wrongs and then grants forgiveness.”190  A federal 
expungement statute would allow ex-offenders to be rewarded for successful efforts at 
rehabilitation. It would encourage decent human beings who have rejected their youthful 
transgressions or a one-off incident in their past in favor of abiding the law to raise a family, seek 
an education, secure gainful employment, and contribute to society.  It would allow talented 
individuals stigmatized by an isolated lapse in judgment to reacquire a security clearance and 
serve their country as government architects, engineers, scientists, lawyers, and service members. 
It would also keep individuals at a crossroads from returning to the environs that foster antisocial 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
has not yet chosen to do so.”); United States v. Tyler, 670 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1349 (M.D. Fla. 
2009) (“Because judicial expungement of criminal records implicates the separation of powers 
doctrine, Congress should consider enacting legislation allowing relief in limited 
circumstances…Notwithstanding the legitimacy of the Executive Branch's interest in 
maintaining accurate arrest records, there is a question as to the value in creating a permanent 
stigma for a wrongfully accused defendant, the likely results of which will be permanent removal 
from a level playing field of future employment opportunities. And, certainly any interest the 
Executive Branch could have in maintaining the records of illegally procured arrests would be 
minimal at best and outweighed by adverse consequences to the innocent defendant.”). 
190 CATHOLIC CHARITIES USA, SPECIAL POPULATIONS: PRISONER RE-ENTRY, 
http://www.catholiccharitiesusa.org/page.aspx?pid=654. 
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behavior and instead, find jobs and steer clear of a path that lands them back in custody while 
draining valuable taxpayer resources. 
It would allow nonviolent ex-offenders in search of redemption to finally find it, putting 
an end to the lifelong sentence arising from the collateral consequences of having a criminal 
record. 
